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This paper examines the Canadian Jewish response to the Holocaust during the Second 
World War.  Rather than disparaging the Canadian Jewish community for timidity in its 
dealings with Canadian institutions or suggesting that Canadian Jews were disinterested in 
their European brethren, historians need to contextualize Canadian Jewish actions within the 
domestic power structures of the 1940s and the confines of the Canadian Jewish imagination. 
With the Canadian Government censoring the Holocaust, the Canadian Jewish community 
framed the European Jewish tragedy around the idea of resistance to bolster Canadian sym-
pathy for European Jews and give meaning to the Holocaust.
Cet article analyse la réaction des Juifs canadiens face à l’Holocauste. Plutôt que de dénigrer 
la communauté juive canadienne pour sa timidité ou son indifférence, les historiens doivent 
remettre les actions juives canadiennes dans le contexte des structures nationales de pouvoir 
des années 1940 et des limites de l’imagination de l’époque. À cause de la censure gouver-
nementale, la communauté juive canadienne a pensé la tragédie des Juifs européens autour 
de l’idée de résistance afin de renforcer la sympathie des Canadiens et de donner du sens à 
l’Holocauste.
On October 16, 1942, Prime Minister Mackenzie King opened up Canada’s Third 
Victory Bond drive in Montreal by describing what the war against Nazi Germa-
ny meant for Canadians. According to King, Hitler’s war was a Manichean clash 
between two diametrically opposed philosophies. “The Nazi doctrine of a superior 
race implies the subjugation and, if Nazi deeds so demand, the extermination of all 
other people,” King warned. Hitler hoped to secure German hegemony in Europe 
through the wholesale destruction of “other races” and through “a war of extermi-
nation against religion.”1 While King spoke, the most deadly period of the Holocaust 
was underway. Jews across Poland were being systematically removed from ghettos 
and transported to the extermination camps of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. By 
mid-June 1942, approximately one quarter of the Jews who would be exterminated 
by the Nazis had been killed; by February 1943, the Nazis had murdered 4.5 million 
Jews.2 Yet, King did not refer to Jews once in his speech. Instead, he used blanketing 
terms like “religion” and “races” when referring to Hitler’s victims. King’s speech 
epitomised the Canadian Government’s policy of methodically keeping Jews outside 
of its war propaganda, lest Canadians associate the sacrificing of Canadian lives and 
resources with saving Jews. Both the Canadian Government and the Canadian Jewish 
community were concerned that antisemitism would undermine unity and hinder 
the war effort. Yet, Canadian Jewry understood the Canadian war effort through the 
paradigm of Hitler’s war against Jews. In response to government censorship of the 
Holocaust and to build Canadian sympathy, Canadian Jews emphasized that Euro-
pean Jewish victims were not mere hapless victims, but partisans fighting for liberty.
To understand the seeming contradiction of Canada fighting a war of liberation 
while refusing sanctuary to Jews, historians focus on three aspects of the Canadi-
an bystander experience: Canadian antisemitism, knowledge of the Holocaust, and 
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the Canadian Jewish responses. The foundational work on Canadian antisemitism is 
Irving Abella and Harold Troper’s None Is Too Many, which provides copious doc-
umentation showing that the decision to prevent Jews from escaping to Canada was 
“a political decision.”3 Numerous studies have followed, showing that antisemitism 
manifested itself differently amongst the English-speaking elite, Québecois nation-
alists, and populist movements. Despite variation, the tragic consequence of Canadi-
an antisemitism was the same: a lack of political will to make Canada a sanctuary for 
Jews trying to escape Europe.4 
Historians also debate whether Canadians comprehended or believed during the 
war that Jews were systematically being exterminated by Hitler.5 The conventional 
position is that the liberation of the concentration camps in 1945 saturated Western 
media with horrific images of Nazi atrocities and led to a realization of the Holo-
caust.6 Some scholars have challenged this argument, noting that the majority of vic-
tims found in concentration camps were not Jewish since the extermination camps 
were located in Eastern Europe and were either destroyed by the Nazis or liberated 
by Soviet forces. Since the Canadian press failed to delve into “the centrality of an-
tisemitism in Nazi ideology” and de-emphasized the Jewish identity of Hitler’s vic-
tims, scholars have argued that the Holocaust was minimized in Western discourse 
and even within Canadian-Jewish circles until the late 1960s.7 
The suggestion that the Western public remained unaware of Hitler’s destruction of 
Europe’s Jews has bled into the occasionally disparaging discussion about the North 
American Jewish community’s response to the Holocaust.8 Holding true to Michael 
R. Marrus’ observation that there is a “strong tendency” in the historical literature 
on bystanders to “condemn, rather than to explain,”9 historians have indicted the 
Canadian Jewish community for being timid in its negotiations with the Canadian 
Government and for failing to draw the public’s attention to the Jewish tragedy in 
Europe.10 Max Beer condemns the Canadian Jewish community for being apathetic 
to European Jewry, claiming that Canadian Jews were more interested in being per-
ceived as patriotic than in saving the lives: “as the war progressed loyalty to Canada 
and support for the war effort became the overriding issues for the community and 
the leadership and concern for their European brethren faded into the background.”11 
This article will attempt to unravel the various conflicting interpretations that sur-
round Canadian responses to the Holocaust by examining the relationship between 
the Canadian war effort and domestic antisemitism. Whereas the Canadian Govern-
ment attempted to solidify support for the war by universalizing the victims and fo-
cusing on the Nazi perpetrators, Canadian Jews sought to build sympathy for Jewish 
victims by presenting European Jewry within the confines of the military struggle to 
defeat tyranny. For Canadian Jews, framing the Holocaust around the theme of re-
sistance—rather than victimization—worked to give meaning to the enormous loss 
of life. The Canadian Jewish Congress’ negotiations with the Canadian Government 
106 Norman Erwin / The Holocaust, Canadian Jews, and Canada’s “Good War” Against Nazism
progressed slowly to ease immigration regulations and secure an avenue for Jewish 
refugees to escape Nazi-occupied territories through neutral countries. Canadian 
Jews saw Germany’s defeat as the best hope for saving Europe’s Jews. 
Keeping the Holocaust out of “The Good War”
When Prime Minister Mackenzie King brought Canada’s declaration of war before 
Parliament on September 10, 1939, his stated purpose was to defend freedom, the 
British Empire, and Western civilization. King’s three hour speech made no mention 
of Jews, but focused on Germany’s violation of international conventions. Hitler’s 
“wanton disregard of all treaty obligations” and dastardly use of “terrorism and vio-
lence,” according to King, demanded that Canada join the Christian crusade against 
Nazi Germany to save the liberal order: 
The forces of evil have been loosed in the world in a struggle between the 
pagan conception of a social order which ignores the individual and is based 
upon the doctrine of might and a civilization based upon the Christian con-
ception of the brotherhood of man, with its regard for the sanctity of con-
tractual relations and the sacredness of human personality.12
Following the declaration, the Canadian Government embarked on a public opin-
ion campaign to solidify support behind the war effort by depicting Canada as the 
antithesis of Nazi Germany, contrasting Canadian “biracial” political character and 
its large immigrant population with Nazism’s master race philosophy.13 Although a 
significant aspect of the program to demonize Nazi Germany was shedding light on 
Nazi atrocities, the Canadian Government neglected drawing attention to the exter-
mination of Europe’s Jews. King’s speeches throughout the war explicitly excluded 
any mention of Jews. At Chateau Laurier on September 17, 1941, King argued that the 
core of Germany’s national chauvinism was the Prussian militaristic mentality: 
It is the real force behind the Nazi terror. It is the real secret of German 
power. It remains the implacable foe. The German war machine, the inhu-
man monster which the Prussian mind has created and continues to direct 
has already ravaged a whole continent and impoverished, enslaved, stran-
gled, or devoured millions of human lives. It is a dragon which can only be 
slain by fighting men.14 
There are two reasons why King specifically minimized the Jewish tragedy in his 
speeches. First, he was more concerned about Hitler’s threat to Christianity than 
to Jews. Following a tortuous line of logic, King became convinced that Hitler was 
murdering Jews in order to destroy Christianity. King arrived at this notion following 
a meeting with two prominent Zionists, Archibald J. Freiman and Chaim Weizmann 
on May 9, 1941. When Weizmann made the point that Nazism was an antichristian 
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philosophy, King took it to mean “that Hitlerism was not aimed against the Jews fun-
damentally but at Christianity through the Jews. That what Hitler was out to destroy 
was Christendom. I believe in this he [Weizmann] is right. He [Hitler] does not want 
a brotherhood of man. He wants to have his fellow-men ruled by an armed guard.” 15
Second, King sensed astutely that Canadians were uninterested in the murder of Jews 
and hostile to the idea of Canada becoming a haven for Jewish refugees. He said as 
much to Emil Ludwig, a German-Jewish historical writer, who appealed to King on 
June 11, 1944 to allow Jewish refugees to settle in Canada to escape Hitler: “I explained 
to him again the nature of the political problem, the difficulty of a leader of a govt. 
bringing up this question on the eve of an election but agreed that Canada would 
have to open her doors and fill many of her large waste spaces with population once 
our own men had returned from the front.” Rescuing Jews was not politically expe-
dient. Frustrated that offering his sympathy was not enough, King wrote in his diary 
following Ludwig’s visit: “I must say when one listens to accounts of their [Jewish] 
persecutions, one cannot have any human sympathies without being prepared to do 
much on their behalf.”16 While there was political capital to be gained by decrying 
Hitler’s atrocities, focusing on the Jewish aspect of the Nazis’ murdering rampage 
was counterintuitive in King’s mind. More effective was suggesting that the Nazi 
scourge threatened Canadians directly on the home front. Images in war bond ad-
vertisements often presented Canada’s most vulnerable members, such as women and 
children, in danger of capture, to invoke compassion from Canada’s paternalistic culture.
Gordon K. Odell, 1941-42, Canadian War 
Poster Collection, Rare Books and Special 
Collections, McGill University Library.17
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The most elaborate fundraising operation, “If Day,” simulated the occupation of 
Winnipeg by mock Nazi forces on February 19, 1942, but paid no heed to the Nazi 
persecution of Jews, despite its intended purpose of awakening the Canadian imagi-
nation to the horrors of the Nazi threat. Terror was envisaged through an emergency 
blackout at 7 AM amid the screaming of air raid sirens to recreate the London blitz. 
The Nazi attack on liberty was embodied by troops attired in Wehrmacht uniforms 
burning books in front of the public library. These Nazis targeted the freedom of the 
press, with the Winnipeg Tribune being printed in German and renamed Das Win-
nipeger Lügenblatt.18 Premier John Bracken, his cabinet, and the mayor were arrested, 
churches were closed, and a curfew imposed. However, there were no reports in the 
local press that these mock Nazi soldiers rounded up Jews specifically. No indication 
that Jewish shops were targeted and looted. In fact, Life magazine’s coverage of the 
spectacle noted that the “‘Nazis’ close[d] the Protestant and Catholic Church,” appar-
ently leaving synagogues alone.19 Presumably, due to the absence of antisemitism in 
this fake Nazi assault on Winnipeg, the Canadian Jewish press refused to cover the 
event.20
The obscuration of the Holocaust was mandated throughout the Canadian propa-
ganda infrastructure. The two government agencies that controlled information re-
garding Canada’s war effort—the Wartime Information Board (WIB) and the Na-
tional Film Board (NFB)—were remarkably silent about the mass murder of Jews, 
even during the liberation of the concentration camps. Throughout most of the war, 
both agencies were led by John Grierson, the commissioner of the NFB and the 
WIB’s General Manager until 1944. Although he focused on presenting different as-
pects of the war effort to build unity among Canadians, Grierson also produced doc-
umentaries that dealt with aspects of Nazi atrocities. These films were carefully ed-
ited and scripted to avoid referencing the unique tragedy befalling Jews. When asked 
by his American Jewish friend Arthur Gottlieb in 1944 why the NFB “has maintained 
a virtual silence about Hitler’s war against the Jews,” Grierson initially tried to jus-
tify the NFB’s stance by claiming that “there just is no contemporary footage about 
the rumours we keep hearing about.” Gottlieb remained unconvinced and pressed 
Grierson further: “you know bloody well the killing machine against the Jews goes 
on unchecked. Let’s face it. Canada is an anti-Semitic country that couldn’t give a 
damn about the Jews.” Grierson admitted that he was not entirely wrong and that 
the government was “willing to be led, rather than to lead a Canadian public opinion 
that is frankly anti-Semitic, particularly in Québec.” On why the NFB had produced 
no documentary on Jewish refugees, Grierson explained that his hands were tied: 
The Cabinet War Committee declared Canada’s information policy on this 
issue: remain silent. Ottawa ordered all atrocity stories held up until they 
could be verified….Government policy has spared Canadian civilian morale 
and some possible guilt feelings. Mr. King’s government has long depended 
upon Québec’s votes and seats in Parliament, and English Canada fears be-
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coming awash in a sea of Jewish refugees. The government is not prepared 
to lose votes on the Jewish issue. It is a closed subject at the NFB.21
NFB productions consistently censored the Holocaust for the duration of the war. 
Both the NFB’s major series on the Second World War, Canada Carries On and World 
In Action, took exceptional care to avoid discussing Europe’s Jews, instead describing 
the war experience from multiple perspectives and delving into the political im-
plications of the Nazis’ bid for hegemony in Europe. In the 1942 film, War for Men’s 
Minds, the NFB examined Nazi ideology at length without mentioning Hitler’s an-
tisemitism. The film states that the heart of the Nazi “creed was violence,” which the 
narrator contrasted with the British liberal tradition: “And in every quarter of her 
[Britain’s] Empire – wherever her subjects aspired to the freedom of self-govern-
ment – Britain held up this old liberal ideal of change by gradual reform.” 22 Even in 
its short documentary in 1945 on the liberation of the concentration camps, Behind 
the Swastika: Nazi Atrocities, the NFB continued to obscure the nature of the victims 
by claiming that atrocities were directed against individuals who challenged the Na-
zis’ tyrannical rule. In one scene, as the camera panned across liberated, emaciated 
prisoners, the narrator declared, “These are the men who dared to defy the Fueh-
rer, free thinking men who believed in the democratic principles, Jews and Gentile. 
Their only crime was that they were anti-Nazi. They were herded into concentra-
tion camps and left to the mercy of sadistic guards, who beat, starved, and murdered 
them in thousands.” 23 Although concentration camps were created to hold political 
prisoners, by 1945, many concentration camps, such as Belsen, held thousands of Jews 
who had survived death marches from evacuated extermination camps.
Lack of reliable information about the Holocaust cannot explain the Canadian Gov-
ernment’s decision to keep the Holocaust out of the public spotlight. A substantial 
quantity of intelligence on the extermination of the Jews was collected and analysed 
by foreign governments and forwarded to the Department of External Affairs and 
even the Wartime Information Board. One of the most detailed and earliest sources 
available was a confidential series entitled “Report on Jewry,” prepared by a team of 
researchers in Britain’s Ministry of Information.24 Using intercepted correspondence 
mainly between Jewish informants in Europe and the Middle East and American 
Jewish charity agencies, the British compiled lengthy reports on the conditions fac-
ing European Jewry, attached translated copies of the correspondence, and distrib-
uted the material to its Allies. The fifth report, dated February 9, 1943, and received 
in Ottawa on May 14, 1943, covered the period from September to December 1942, 
and began by making clear that the latest information “brings the toll of deporta-
tion and mass murder a stage further towards the apparently intended climax of 
complete extermination.” With regards to Jewish efforts to effect rescue, the writer 
noted that “it is an ironical fact that considerable facilities for immigration have 
now been offered by the Western Hemisphere when apparently insuperable barriers 
have arisen in Europe.”25 What followed was a breakdown by occupied country of the 
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anti-Jewish laws being enforced and the number of Jews being deported to the East. 
Of particular note was the section on Poland, which documented the acceleration 
of the Final Solution from “first hand accounts from deportees in Poland, sent by 
underground routes through neutral intermediaries to London.” Under the header 
“Mass Murder on Polish Territory,” the British author warned that the Nazis were 
speeding up their extermination campaign against Jews, chronicling that “during 
September rumors began to accumulate from many sources regarding a plan for 
the wholesale massacre of the Jews deported to Russia and Poland.” These “rumors” 
were now facts, according to the report, and there was solid evidence that “there was 
a plan behind these measures [deportation] to exterminate immediately the largest 
possible number of Jews.” According to various sources listed, half of the Warsaw 
Ghetto had been “liquidated” by October 1942.26 As early as November 12, 1943, Ex-
ternal Affairs also had accounts from Jewish partisans who had witnessed the Jewish 
communities of Bendin, Dabrowa and Sosnowiec being rounded up and sent “to the 
annihilation camp at Oswiecim.”27
Canada’s Department of External Affairs also received reports from Govern-
ments-in-Exile, specifically Poland and Czechoslovakia, which revealed that Jews 
were being hunted and murdered en masse throughout Europe. Following the razing 
of Lidice, Dr. Hubert Ripka, the Czechoslovakian Secretary of State, informed Vin-
cent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada in London, on two separate occasions, 
June 2 and 17, 1942, of the terror unleashed by the Nazis at Lidice and Lezaky in ret-
ribution for Reinhard Heydrich’s assassination. On February 26, 1943, Jan Masaryk, 
Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, told Massey of the continuing efforts of the Nazis 
to squash resistance in Czechoslovakia, noting that in the week following Heydrich’s 
death, 1,288 individuals had been murdered by the Nazis. Interestingly, Masaryk also 
pointed out that Kurt Daluege, who was appointed Deputy Protector of Moravia and 
Bohemia following Heydrich’s death, had “intensified the anti-Semitic measures” 
and “expedited the deportations.” By the end of 1942, only 18,000 Jews remained of 
the 90,000 Jews in pre-war Bohemia and Moravia. In Slovakia, an additional 76,000 
Jews had been deported to Poland, leaving only 19,000 Jews, most of whom Masaryk 
said were awaiting their own deportation to concentration camps.28 
Recent historical research confirms that Masaryk’s report to Massey was quite accu-
rate. From June to December 1942, 61,490 Jews were transported from the Protector-
ate of Bohemia and Moravia to Theresienstadt Camp, which served as a transit camp 
for Jews destined for the extermination camps further east.29 Between March and 
August 1942, an additional 58,000 Jews, accounting for seventy-five percent of Slovak 
Jews were also deported mainly to Auschwitz.30 Moreover, Heydrich’s death provid-
ed an impetus to accelerate the Final Solution. Heinrich Himmler blamed the Jews 
for his friend’s death and told SS officers that “it is our sacred obligation to avenge 
his death, to take over his mission and to destroy without mercy and weakness…the 
enemies of our people.”31 Although the decision to murder all of Europe’s Jews was 
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taken some time in September-October 1941, historians agree that Heydrich’s assas-
sination generated an atmosphere of revenge against the Jews and “accelerated the 
extermination process,” not just in the Protectorate, but throughout German-occu-
pied Europe.32 
Information on the Holocaust was not restricted to the confidential files of Canada’s 
External Affairs; detailed reports of the Holocaust also made their way into Wartime 
Information Board files. These reports could have been used as a source for its fund-
raising campaigns and propaganda materials, but were not. In late 1942, the WIB re-
ceived a copy of Bestiality…unknown in any previous record of history, a grisly document 
on the crimes perpetrated against Poles. Although this report was commissioned 
by the Polish Government-in-Exile, and thus framed Germany’s crimes against all 
Poles, it did contain a section on the “destruction of the Jewish population.” Ghettos 
were described as places of death, which had “incredibly miserable conditions, the 
mortality is enormous, and it is an everyday phenomenon for dead bodies to be lying 
in the streets.” However, the method of murder had quickened from death by starva-
tion and disease to mass shootings and asphyxiation. British Minister of Information, 
Brendan Bracken, was quoted as estimating that 700,000 Jews had been murdered in 
Poland by the summer of 1942. Most of the Lublin ghetto had been transported “over 
a period of several days to the locality of Sobibor…where they were all murdered 
with gas, machine-guns and even by being bayoneted.” The Poles warned that the 
“Jewish population in Poland is doomed to die out in accordance with the slogan, ‘All 
the Jews should have their throats cut, no matter what the outcome of the war may 
be.’” 33 Bracken’s estimate was no exaggeration. A Nazi radio telegram to Adolf Eich-
mann that was intercepted by British intelligence – but not understood for decades 
– put the figure of Jewish death in the Reinhard Camps for 1942 at 1,274,555.34
Numerous research papers in the WIB files centred racial thinking at the heart of 
Nazi ideology. Most notably the WIB collected Wiener Library’s The Nazis at War 
bulletin35, which translated and contextualized Nazi press statements and speeches 
about war aims.36 Many other analyses on Nazi racism in the WIB files were writ-
ten by Britain’s Ministry of Information. In one document on German education, 
the author noted that “the Nazi system is based on the twin myths of racial purity 
and racial superiority. Its aims are the glorification of the German people and their 
domination of all other peoples by conquest.”37 In another document discussing Ger-
man war aims, copious documentation demonstrates that Hitler was carving out a 
colonial empire in Europe based on a racial hierarchy to be achieved in two stages: 
enslavement and extermination. The Jewish extermination was essential to this mis-
sion: 
Nazi Germany aims to go back not only to the days of slavery, but ultimately, 
to the still more primitive times before slavery, on which enslavement in its 
day was a forward step, -- namely the times when victors simply extermi-
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nated the vanquished, as in the jungle. The start has been made with the 
Jews, then with the Poles, -- to be continued elsewhere.38 
Despite this 20,000-word document only referencing Jews in two other locations, 
this minimization of the Holocaust should not be taken to mean that information 
was unknown. Rather, Hitler’s crimes against Jews were so familiar that the report 
explained its minimal treatment by claiming “the systematic German policy of ex-
termination of Jews everywhere and taking over their places by Germans are too 
notorious to need quotations in proof.”
While lack of information cannot explain the Canadian Government’s silence on 
the Holocaust, there is evidence that any effort to tie Canada’s war effort to Hitler’s 
atrocities against European Jews would alienate Québec opinion. The most palpable 
expression of antisemitic derision over Canada’s fight against Nazism was a series 
of anti-Jewish riots in Montreal in anticipation for the April 27, 1942 plebiscite on 
whether the Government should be released from its promise not to institute the 
draft. On March 17, 1942, following an anti-conscription meeting with Liberal MP 
Jean-Francois Pouliot sponsored by the League for the Defence of Canada, an es-
timated 450 youths paraded down a predominantly Jewish section of Saint Laurent 
Boulevard, yelling “À bas les Juifs!”, smashing several shop windows, and initiating 
several violent altercations with local Jewish residents in front of the Young Men’s 
Hebrew Association. The police managed to chase the demonstrators away, arresting 
eight youths.38 Although a larger and more violent anti-conscription riot had unset-
tled the city a month earlier following a speech by Henri Bourassa, which left a dozen 
police officers injured, it had been devoid of antisemitic expression.39 The Montreal 
press insisted that the antisemitism in Québec should not be exaggerated. Torchy 
Anderson of the Montreal Gazette wrote: “don’t think that all the people of Québec 
are shouting ‘À bas la conscription,’ and breaking Jewish shop windows. The great 
majority of them are reading the world news in the newspapers—and understanding 
it.”40 The Montreal Daily Star agreed, maintaining that “these young men should not 
be taken seriously.”41 
Moreover, antisemitic conspiratorial beliefs within Canadian society tempered Ca-
nadians to remain sceptical of Jewish atrocities. As John Grierson explained, “I re-
member how propaganda in the First World War contained atrocity stories that 
proved invented or exaggerated….Besides, we and the Yanks are sensitive to Ger-
man propaganda that continues to insist that the Jews are pulling the Allies’ political 
strings.” With the latent belief in Canada that the Jews somehow were driving the 
war, the Canadian Government mandated a “remain silent” policy and “ordered all 
atrocities help up until they could be verified.” Grierson understood this to be a gag 
order: “How in Hell’s name do we verify what’s going on in the heart of Nazi Eu-
rope?”42 Similar to the United States, where atrocity stories were believed to be exag-
gerated to alter America’s isolationist stance,43 some Canadians, especially populists 
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who adhered to the Social Credit philosophy, denied that the Holocaust happened.44 
By distancing war aims from the Holocaust, the Canadian Government ensured Ca-
nadians did not get the impression that “the Jews” were controlling policy. Govern-
ment statements, therefore, on Nazi atrocities tended to avoid mentioning Jews, as 
they were a dividing issue amongst Canadians. To better serve the war effort, the 
Canadian Government framed the discourse on Nazi atrocities around Germany’s 
illiberal and antichristian policies.
The Canadian Jewish War Effort and the Holocaust 
Britain’s declaration of war on Germany in 1939 was received with relief by Canadian 
Jews. Even before Canada issued its own declaration of war, poet and editor for the 
Canadian Jewish Chronicle, A. M. Klein championed the West’s decision to fight Nazi 
Germany, even if it led to another world war resulting in “a holocaust [of] stupendous 
proportions.” The question of the Jewish diaspora’s support of military conflict, for 
Klein, had been settled by Hitler years earlier:
The reaction of Jewry permits of no ambiguity. For six years the Nazis have 
carried on a relentless war against our people, a war directed against the 
defenceless, inspired by no reason save the instincts of savagery, and con-
ducted without let-up, without restraint, without quarter. Its objective has 
been shouted from the roof-tops, and has been echoed across the world—
the utter destruction, the complete annihilation of Jewry. 45
Supporting the war effort was of the utmost importance since Klein rightly suspected 
that Jews “shall not survive a British defeat.” A. B. Bennett, a founder of the Canadian 
Jewish Congress, described this sentiment years later: “the feeling of helplessness, of 
aloneness in a world of cruelty gave way to a spirit of Militancy. The Jews had allies 
in the fight against Hitlerism.”46 Supporting the war effort and saving Europe’s Jews 
were interrelated in the minds of Canadian Jews. Ending Hitler’s reign over Europe 
and preserving the British Empire was paramount to saving Europe’s Jews.
In the early years of the war, Samuel Bronfman, president of the Canadian Jewish 
Congress, reiterated the sentiment that the lives of European Jews could only be 
safeguarded by the military defeat of Nazism. At the Inter-American Jewish Con-
ference less than a month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Bronfman stated: “im-
mediately as our country declared war against the Nazi barbarian, the Canadian 
Jewish Congress forthwith geared its activity to one end—a maximum war effort 
upon all fronts. All other problems became, by the very nature of things, purely 
incidental; for the supreme objective included all the subsidiary goals.”47 In Samuel 
Bronfman’s fiftieth birthday address, he reaffirmed Canadian Jewry’s loyalty to the 
Crown: “How imperative it is for us, living in the land of freedom, to do all that we 
can, and more, to preserve the Empire, to save Europe from itself, to safeguard the 
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principles of decent human conduct, and, by glorious deed, to ransom our brothers 
from their captivity.”48 While Bronfman emphasized that the freedom of all peoples 
was at stake, he made it clear that the Jews had a special interest in the war.
During the first several years of the war, the Canadian Jewish Congress focused on 
promoting recruitment and fundraising. In 1940, the CJC opened a recruiting center 
for Canada’s military in Montreal. It distributed a brochure calling for volunteers, 
emphasizing that the military struggle was not only to protect the British Empire, 
but also Europe’s Jews: 
The Nazi hordes are increasing the momentum of the war from day to 
day—more and more millions of brave men are thrown into the life-and-
death struggle for the preservation of their national existence. Hitler has 
vowed to conquer the British Empire, destroy the Jewish race, and to enslave 
the whole world. Hitler is fighting desperately, making use of tremendous 
forces to attain his goal—to become the sole dictator of the world. Hitler’s 
victory would mean the destruction of our Empire and the annihilation of 
our people. There is only one answer to this challenge: Hitler and his gang 
must be destroyed.49 
Indeed many Jews joined Canada’s military because they wanted to strike back at the 
Nazis after reading about the persecution of the Jews, even if they did not yet know 
that Hitler intended to exterminate them. In a series of interviews in the 1980s by the 
Jewish Heritage Centre of Western Canada, several Jews from Winnipeg remem-
bered enlisting to protect European brethren. One man signed up in 1940 after read-
ing newspaper accounts of Jewish persecution: “it bothered him when he heard how 
the Jews were being discriminated against in Europe,” the interviewer recounted.50 
A Jewish woman recalled enlisting “partly because of the horror” enacted against the 
Jews, “though she soon realized that her efforts weren’t going to make the differ-
ence.”51 Another Jewish man joined the Army just days after Canada’s entry into the 
war, specifically remarking that his “decision to join the service came with a clearer 
understanding of what was happening in Europe” and was “not motivated by patri-
otism” but by concern for European Jewry.52 Percy Jacobson, a Jewish small business 
owner who kept a detailed diary documenting the political and social climate in 
Montreal during the war, noted that his son joined the RCAF in 1939, because, as Ja-
cobson said, “we are Jews and Hitler’s persecution of the Jews will go down into his-
tory along with the stories of the Spanish Inquisition.”53 Historian Gerald Tulchinsky 
argues that numerous Jews signed up because they had a personal stake in defeating 
Nazism as both Canadians and Jews. He quotes Rabbi David Monson, who tried to 
recruit Jews by arguing that they had even more to fight for than Christians: “if Hit-
ler wins, Christians will be slaves. Jews will be committed to death.”54
By January 1, 1944, 12,000 Jewish people had volunteered for military service.55 The 
115Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes, vol. 24, 2016
CJC also furnished and operated sixteen recreational centers across the country to 
help boost morale among military personnel. Thousands of “comfort boxes” and 
millions of cigarettes were purchased by the CJC and sent to Canadian soldiers on 
the frontlines. 56 In 1940, Bronfman personally donated $250,000 to the Canadian 
Government to research the technology needed to speed up the defeat of Germany, 
this was in addition to the one million dollars of war bonds Bronfman purchased 
annually.57 In December 1941, Bronfman emphasized the Canadian Jewish Congress’ 
dedication to the war effort: “Hundreds of thousands of Jews have been up-rooted 
from their homes, have been forced into slavery and herded into ghettos. They have 
been living a life worse than death....To remove this scourge is the mission of all re-
maining free peoples....They will not lay down their arms until Hitlerism has been 
completely destroyed.”58 
By 1942, Canadian-Jewish newspapers were filling up with news that over one mil-
lion European Jews had been massacred. Much of this information in the press came 
from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.59 The Jewish Labor Committee was especially 
active in bringing experts on Nazi anti-Jewish policy to Canada to reveal the trag-
edy befalling Europe’s Jews, to raise funds to feed trapped Jews, and to help them 
escape. On February 16, 1943, the JLC invited Jacob Pat, a Polish journalist who had 
escaped to New York in 1938, to speak in Montreal about the situation facing Polish 
Jews. His graphic descriptions of the Nazi murder of 10,000 children executed in gas 
vans in a single day in August 1943, and his description of a fifty square kilometer 
area around the town of Belgite “dotted with fires” radiating from pyres of burning 
corpses, made the local press.60 General Secretary of the WJC, Arieh Tartakower, who 
had fled Poland following the Nazi invasion, was invited to speak in Winnipeg on 
April 4, 1943 about the ongoing efforts to save Europe’s Jews.61 The Winnipeg Evening 
Tribune described his talk as a “somber accounting of how 2,000,000 Jews have died 
in Europe under the scourge of Hitler,” and stressed that “if his figures erred, they 
erred as under-estimates.” Tartakower insisted that what was needed was the imme-
diate shipping of foodstuffs to starving European Jews and the declaration of various 
allied countries to provide temporary havens for Jews who had escaped to neutral 
countries, thus facilitating a route to safety.62
The Canadian Jewish community sought to draw mainstream Canadians’ attention to 
the Holocaust. Ben Sheps, a CJC official in Winnipeg, wrote Bronfman on July 6, 1942, 
complaining about the lack of coverage of Jewish atrocities in the mainstream press 
at the time: “with the exception of a few brief paragraphs in the daily press, little, 
if any comment has been made by the Canadian newspapers, in Western Canada at 
least, on these atrocious happenings.”63 Sheps speculated that due to this lack of cov-
erage in the mainstream dailies, “very many [Canadians] are unfortunately unaware 
of the slaughter of the Jewish civilian population which is taking place in German 
occupied countries at present.” Hoping to return Canadian sentiment against Nazi 
antisemitism to what it was “shortly after his [Hitler’s] rise to power,” Sheps urged the 
116 Norman Erwin / The Holocaust, Canadian Jews, and Canada’s “Good War” Against Nazism
CJC to launch a nationwide protest immediately, before organizations such “as the 
Jewish Branch of the League for Allied Victory, which is Communist inspired, may 
take advantage of the situation and endeavor to capture Jewish sympathy.”
Mass meetings began to be organized by the Canadian Jewish community in 1942 
to raise awareness of the Holocaust. The purpose of the meetings was not simply to 
voice the “indignation of all civilized men against the abominable barbarism prac-
tised by the Nazi savages against our race,” but to create “resolutions and speeches 
stressing the unity of Jews and of the United Nations in their determination to stop 
at nothing short of freedom.”64 The organizers hoped not only to harden Canadian 
resolve to wage war, but also to stir up public sympathy and compel the government 
to change its refugee policy. One CJC executive sent a letter to the Montreal Jewish 
community leadership, stating that “the inhuman sufferings and tribulations of our 
unfortunate brethren in occupied countries should arouse the conscience of every 
civilized man and woman.... We must arouse public opinion!”65 In October 1942, the 
Canadian Jewish community organized three mass protests in Winnipeg, Toronto, 
and Montreal. The Winnipeg Division of the CJC explained that these mass meet-
ings “would focus public attention on the sufferings of the Jews in Nazi-occupied 
Europe, and would bring about an authoritative expression of opinion which would 
be spread throughout Canada.”66
In 1942, Canadian Jews also coordinated memorial services for the Nazis’ Jewish vic-
tims as a method to raise awareness of the Holocaust and as a means of grieving 
for their European brethren. Although some community members believed that 
mourning the dead was counterintuitive while the struggle to defeat Nazi Germany 
continued, Canadian Jewish memorial services were nevertheless held. The Pales-
tine rabbinate declared December 2 a day of mourning and the Canadian Jewish 
community followed suit, despite A. B. Bennett’s disapproval. Writing in his reg-
ular column in the Canadian Jewish Chronicle, Bennett argued that memorials were 
dangerous and could sap energy from the war effort: “can we afford to divert our 
attention and energy from the practical tasks at hand and indulge in an orgy of 
unproductive hysteria?” One historian has taken Bennett’s words to mean that he 
was indifferent to the suffering of European Jewry and that this attitude was shared 
by much of the Jewish community.67 However, Bennett was not being apathetic; he 
believed that this was the time to redouble the Jewish community’s efforts to de-
stroy Nazi Germany and save Jewish lives. He ended his column by writing: “does 
not God in His wisdom expect the human spirit today to speak forth His message 
in a voice of steel, in the accents of cannon thunder, to silence and [s]lay the ram-
pant genius of evil. Human beings have but measured reserves of nervous strength. 
We must husband our powers for the great venture of annihilating Hitlerism.”68 Yet 
memorial services were held in “nearly every community across the country,” the 
Canadian Jewish Chronicle reported. In Toronto, Bennett himself opened the Kaddish 
service in Massey Hall, where several thousand participated. Numerous synagogues 
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throughout Montreal offered memorial services to mourners. Non-Jewish politi-
cians frequently spoke during these services, often using the Jewish community’s 
grief to consolidate their contribution to the war effort. Thanks to fliers and posters 
being distributed throughout November, many public schools in Toronto and Mon-
treal assembled their pupils on December 2, regardless of whether or not they were 
Jewish, and told them of the great suffering that Jews were enduring in Europe. High 
school students were asked to observe a moment of silence and Jewish labour unions 
demanded that their workers be allowed to do likewise.69
The close association of the war effort and destruction of European Jews for Cana-
dian Jews led Canadian Zionists to politicize Hitler’s victims and emphasize Jewish 
resistance. Indeed, tens of thousands of Jews in Eastern Europe did revolt in ghettos 
or escaped to join Soviet partisan movements in forests, but the vast majority of 
Jews—with no access to fire-arms, no training, and surrounded by hostile popu-
lations—remained with their families, fearful of Nazi reprisals if they did revolt.70 
Nonetheless, stories of Jewish partisan activity seemed to confirm that European 
Jewry had militarized. At a JLC organized mass meeting on October 4, 1941, Wil-
liam Green, president of the American Federation of Labor placed the Nazi mass 
murders within the context of the military conflict. While he did not minimize the 
destruction of European Jews—noting that one and a half million Jews had already 
been slaughtered since the beginning of the war—he asserted that these deaths were 
attributed to political resistance, the victims having been “starved to death or killed 
in action resisting their merciless oppressors.” He demanded that Canadian Jews 
ignore their “personal, petty and immediate interests” and devote their resources to 
winning the war.71 Similarly, Jacob Pat emphasized that the Jews were resisting the 
Nazis and were mobilizing, “awaiting the signal of invasion to spring upon the Nazis 
from behind.”72 
Ghetto uprisings were given prominence in the Canadian Jewish press because they 
reinforced the perception that Jews were fighters against Nazi tyranny. The Cana-
dian Jewish Chronicle noted that Jewish resistance demonstrated the national spirit 
of the Jewish people: “They gave their lives so that Israel, as a living force, might go 
on.”73 The Jewish Western Bulletin stated that comparing the uprising to Stalingrad 
was “apt” and hoped that it would “inspire further active resistance.”74 By situating 
Jewish resistance within the context of a war of liberation, Canadian Zionists argued 
that Jews constituted a nation that deserved a state. A. M. Klein contended that the 
uprising “stands as a constant tribute to Jewish valour” and “gave the lie to the re-
peated and malicious slanders of Nazidom” 75 that the Jews were ‘parasitic’ and did 
not possess the spiritual energy to work and build a state.76 Acclaimed Canadian 
Jewish correspondent for the Toronto Star, Pierre van Paassen, agreed: “Those men 
and women of Warsaw’s Ghetto died that Judaism may live. They went under in 
order that Jewish children may laugh and play tomorrow in the free sun of a Jewish 
Commonwealth in Eretz Israel.”77 Even after the war, at a rally in Toronto celebrating 
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the opening of Palestine to Jewish immigrants, Jewish MP David Croll continued to 
associate European Jewry with the Allies: 
Let the world not forget that the Jews were the first people who fought the 
Nazis, and suffered; who bore the brunt of the vicious persecution and who 
lost 6,000,000 souls, more than was lost by all the Allied armies during the 
war. Let the world not forget, also, that on every battlefront, in every land, 
the Jewish fought on the side of the Allies.”78
The Canadian Jewish focus on resistance can also be explained by the spiritual crisis 
that had enveloped their community. At Holy Blossom Temple, news of the Holo-
caust heavily impacted religious life. At the Annual Congregational Dinner on April 
12, 1945, the synagogue paid homage to the Canadian Jewish soldiers who had served 
both their country and their morals to fight against Nazism. In a prepared speech, 
Rabbi Abraham Feinberg explained that the war and the destruction of European 
Jewry had shaken his congregation’s faith. Canadian Jews had been traumatised by 
Hitler’s war against the Jews and he saw his role as maintaining Jewish morale: “Ev-
ery current of conflict, every hurricane of disaster, even from far-off Majdanek, ev-
ery cold blast of insecurity and fear sweeping through Jewish hearts, inevitably swirls 
around the Rabbi.” Feinberg noted that membership at the Temple had “increased 
enormously” as Canadian Jews attempted to understand the spiritual meaning of the 
Holocaust: “at no point in our tumultuous and tear drenched past has the danger of 
physical destruction and spiritual demoralization been as great.” The synagogue’s 
religious school had also dramatically grown in size, reaching nearly 300 pupils de-
spite the facility originally being designed for only 175. Feinberg explained that under 
the leadership of Peter Hunter and Heinz Warschauer, the school “has been enlarged 
in physical scope and in spiritual intensity.” Even children were questioning Jewish 
practices and traditions as they heard about the tragedy befalling European Jewry: 
“No Jewish child is exempt from the disillusioning impact of the Nazi extermina-
tion-program, anti-Semitic pressure in the immediate environment, the faith-un-
dermining growth of materialistic rationalism and the increasing indifference to 
Jewish practice and values in the average Jewish home.”79
Conclusion 
The Canadian Government lacked the political will to rescue Jewish refugees who 
had been smuggled out of Hitler’s empire during the war. The priority of Prime 
Minister King and his Liberal caucus was to have the country united under their 
leadership and to conduct the war effort. Broaching the issue of Jewish extermina-
tion in Europe would inevitably put more pressure on Canada to open its borders 
to Jewish refugees, which could undermine the Liberal base of support in Québec. 
Thus, throughout the war, the topic was avoided. When mobilizing the Canadian war 
effort, government propaganda suggested that the Nazis were conducting a ruthless 
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campaign to eliminate liberal elements within Europe who opposed Nazism philo-
sophically or through religious conviction.
In stark contrast to the Canadian Government, Canadian Jews viewed the Holocaust 
and the war as intertwined. Since they believed that the Nazis had been waging a war 
against the Jewish people since the 1930s, they interpreted the military conflict as war 
to liberate Jews. Therefore, Canadian Jews threw themselves behind the war effort 
as they believed it was the most tangible and promising means to save European 
Jews. When evidence saturated Canadian Jewish newspapers in 1942 that Hitler’s war 
against Jews had devolved into an extermination campaign, Canadian Jews organized 
numerous protest meetings, drawing in experts on the refugee crisis and observers 
of European conditions to raise awareness of the catastrophe in the hope of building 
public pressure on the Canadian Government to open its doors. Although some of 
the CJC leadership voiced opposition to the flurry of emergency meetings, they were 
not apathetic to European Jewry, but worried that a wave of defeatism would flood 
the Canadian Jewish community and lessen its resolve to fight. To give meaning to 
the massive loss and to address the spiritual crisis that gripped them, Canadian Jews 
emphasized heroic acts of resistance to present European Jews as allies in the fight 
against tyranny and bring the Holocaust into the Canadian war narrative.
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